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Rockets and Feathers? Petroleum Product Price Movements
“Shooting up like a rocket, drifting downward like a feather in the wind,” or so goes the perception of
petroleum product prices. This became the focus of public attention world over in 2008, when the
international price of oil surged in the first six months, only to fall dramatically to a third of its peak
value in the following five months. This briefing note discusses factors influencing the relationship
between the prices of petroleum products on the world market and the domestic retail market.
Increased like the jump of a rabbit but now falling like
the walk of a turtle,” complained a taxi driver about gasoline
prices in Cambodia in October 2008 [1]. Do petroleum prod-
uct prices rise rapidly in times of rising world oil prices and
fall slowly when world prices come down? If so, is this be-
cause of legitimate physical supply issues, such as inven-
tory adjustment costs? Or is such an uneven pattern a result
of uncompetitive market behavior (in which case govern-
ment intervention may be called for)? “Rockets and feath-
ers” have been the subject of much debate and study in the
last two decades. This briefing note reviews the evidence in
other countries and possible explanations for such a price
movement pattern.
Because there are several stages in the supply chain
before petroleum products are sold to consumers, it takes
time before a change in the price of crude oil is fully transmit-
ted to the retail market. In the case of Cambodia, as explained
in [2], the issue is the lag between the time a change in the
price of a refined product occurs in Singapore, Thailand, or
any other country from which Cambodia imports petroleum
products, and the time that change is reflected in the prices
at the retail shops in Cambodia.
One important determinant of price lags is the rate of
inventory turnover. Most firms follow the first-in, first-out
accounting rule. When prices are falling, the first in stock
of refined products would have been purchased when prices
were higher, and conversely when prices are rising, the first
in stock would have been purchased when prices were lower.
If the inventory turnover is faster when prices are rising
than when they are falling—a fast inventory turnover can
occur if the initial inventory is low, if sales volume is high,
or both—that would produce the phenomenon of rockets
and feathers.
A percentage reduction in the world crude oil market
does not generally translate to the same percentage reduc-
tion for retail prices. First, crude oil and petroleum product
prices are governed by different supply and demand forces.
Headline news is usually about the price of a benchmark
crude oil, and over a short span of time crude oil prices
could rise while spot (net-of-tax) prices of refined products
fall, and vice versa. Second, exchange rate fluctuations af-
fect domestic prices even if the world oil prices remain con-
stant, although the Cambodian economy is highly dollarized
and the riel-dollar exchange rate has been stable. Third,
retail petroleum product prices include taxes, which are not
always set in percentage terms. In Cambodia, reference prices
for petroleum products have been frozen since 2004, thereby
converting, in effect, various taxes, set nominally in per-
centages, to specific taxes—constant in riel and conse-
quently independent of the world oil price movement.
Fourth, the costs of shipping, railing, and trucking petro-
leum products—which are included in retail prices—de-
pend only in part on the price of fuel, and again do not
halve if the world oil price halves.
Comparison of net-of-tax free-on-board prices in
Singapore and retail prices (inclusive of taxes) in Phnom Penh
for gasoline and diesel is shown in Figure 1. Cambodian re-
tail prices are smoothed and exhibit less volatility than the
prices in Singapore. As explained above, the tax component
in Cambodia is essentially fixed and does not fluctuate
throughout the period shown in the figure. The diesel price
came down by the same amount from the peak in 2008 to
April 2009 in Singapore and Phnom Penh, but came down
more for gasoline by about US$0.08 a liter in Phnom Penh.
There is no obvious evidence of rockets and feathers
Consumers the world over became alarmed at the pace of
oil price increases in the first half of 2008. Even in a market as
large and competitive as the U.S. gasoline market, a poll taken
in July 2008 found that more than half of those surveyed
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blamed price gouging by oil companies and producing coun-
tries, as well as a lack of effective action by government, for
high oil prices [3].
In Kenya, where prices are determined by market forces,
the energy minister announced in September 2008 that his
ministry would launch a campaign through the media to com-
pel fuel marketers to lower prices by more 10 Kenyan shil-
lings (576 riel) a liter. In October 2008, the energy minister
said that he was not satisfied with the oil companies’ re-
sponse to the government’s request to lower prices, and
tabled the possibility of re-introducing price control [4].
Closer to home, the government of the Philippines in
2008 announced that a joint task force of the Departments
of Energy and of Justice would be investigating if cases of
unfair market practice and overpricing could be filed against
the top three oil companies with a combined market share
of 83 percent. Calls were made in the senate to “act upon”
the oil companies’ pricing practice. In September 2008, when
small oil companies reduced prices but the major oil compa-
nies did not immediately follow, both the energy secretary
and President Arroyo asked the oil companies for an expla-
nation and the energy secretary held a meeting with the
parties concerned. In January 2009, the task force submit-
ted a report, clearing the oil companies of monopolistic prac-
tices and cartelization. In Cambodia, the government formed
a special ministry committee in June 2008 to monitor prices
with a view to assessing if there might be price gouging.
Prime Minister Hun Sen has called upon oil companies to
lower prices on several occasions, and in September 2008
instructed the finance ministry to meet with fuel marketers
to lower prices [4].
These reactions suggest that many consumers per-
ceived the movement of retail prices for petroleum products
in 2008 to be governed by factors other than market forces,
and believed that government intervention would be justi-
fied. If there has indeed been some collusive behavior, then
this becomes a regulatory issue. If, on the other hand, there
has not been price collusion for the most part, government
interventions could even make the matter worse.
The question asked by researchers who have examined
this topic is three-fold:
(1) How long does it take for a change in the price of
crude on the world market to be transmitted to the
domestic retail price?
(2) Are changes in prices passed on fully to consum-
ers?
(3) Is the lag for response the same whether prices are
going up or down?
Most studies concern the movement of retail gasoline
prices, and are part of a larger body of literature on the im-
pact of changes in the prices of inputs (used to manufacture
finished products) on the retail prices of finished goods.
One study examined price changes of 77 consumer and 165
producer goods, and found that prices tend to increase fast
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Figure 1  Monthly Prices of Gasoline and Diesel in Singapore and Phnom Penh
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and decline slowly. It found that the immediate price response
to an increase in input cost is twice the price response to a
decrease in input cost. The study also argued that the more
intermediaries there are in the supply chain, the greater the
difference in speed between price increases and decreases.
However, the study also found that the greater the price
volatility, the smaller the differences in the speed of price
response [5].
In the petroleum sector, a number of studies—mainly in
developed countries—have found that retail prices catch up
more quickly with crude oil price increases than with de-
creases. Given sufficient time, price changes appear to be
fully passed on to consumers eventually. However, a few
studies have also arrived at the opposite conclusions: either
that prices rise as fast as they fall, or, in a couple of studies,
prices fall faster than they rise. Different analytical techniques
and different data sets used account for the differences in
the conclusions. One author used the same datasets in the
United States and applied two different methods, and found
that entirely different conclusions were reached depending
on which method was used [6]. In studying this phenom-
enon, the price movements have been sub-divided further
into various stages in the supply chain.
In situations where researchers believe they have found
faster price increases than decreases, several explanations
have been offered.
♦  Lack of competition. An explanation that has raised the
greatest concern is that arising from a handful of oil
companies dominating the market and tacitly agreeing
not to follow price decreases rapidly. Consider a coun-
try with no refineries. When world prices of refined prod-
ucts rise, oil marketing companies increase retail prices
to ensure that their profit margins do not fall—that is,
they may stand to lose if they do not adjust prices quickly.
When prices of refined products fall on the world mar-
ket, however, oil marketing companies’ profit margins
do not decrease, and for profit maximization it would
make sense to keep prices high until one or more compa-
nies start undercutting the retail prices of the remaining
firms. In a highly competitive market, someone would
start cutting prices immediately to expand the market
share, and others follow. In a market with only a limited
number of firms and not enough competition, it is pos-
sible to have an unspoken and unwritten agreement not
to undercut, and prices could remain high for much
longer and come down much more slowly than the time
it takes for prices to rise in times of rising world prices.
♦  Limits on consumer knowledge of price movements.
Firms can also exploit consumers’ incomplete knowledge
about who is charging how much when and where. It
takes time and effort to visit several shops or filling sta-
tions, compare prices, and choose the seller with the
lowest price. Consumers may try harder to find better
deals when prices are increasing than when prices are
decreasing, potentially reinforcing the phenomenon of
rockets and feathers. If the cost of searching for sellers
with lower prices is high—for example, if prices are not
displayed clearly—then it becomes easier for sellers to
maintain high prices. In contrast, wholesalers can be
sophisticated buyers. Particularly in regions with futures
markets, information about prices is readily available and
changes in the prices of crude oil and refined products
are transmitted rapidly to spot prices at various parts of
the supply chain upstream of retail.
♦  Hoarding. If consumers buy more in anticipation of
further price increases when prices are rising, then in-
ventories are run down faster and prices rise more
quickly. Panic buying in recent years has indeed caused
fuel shortages in the countries where governments con-
trol prices, resulting in fuel shortages and sending prices
high on the black market. If, on the other hand, consum-
ers postpone purchase when prices are falling—because
they expect that the longer they wait, the lower the prices
will be—then the inventory turnover is slowed and prices
correspondingly decrease more slowly.
♦  Inventory adjustment. Oil companies will do whatever
they can to avoid running out of fuels altogether. A re-
duction in supply (which causes price increases) could
prompt a firm to increase selling prices to slow down
sales and avoid running out of refined products, espe-
cially if their own inventories are running low. If sup-
plies are plentiful (causing prices to fall), and if running
an inventory above normal levels carries relatively little
additional cost, there is less incentive to lower prices
rapidly.
♦  Recovering losses. When prices rise steeply—because
of physical disruptions to supplies, demand rising faster
than supply, and so on—refiners and wholesalers may
make a loss. A period of falling prices provides an op-
portunity to recover commercial losses caused by price
shocks by maintaining prices high and sustaining higher
profit margins.
Despite highly sophisticated statistical analysis, re-
searchers in the United States and other developed econo-
mies have found it difficult to arrive at a consensus view on
whether prices rise faster than they fall. This may be an indi-
cation that limits on market competition, if they exist at all,
are small in these countries, in part because of tight regula-
tion governing anti-competitive behavior. There is stronger
evidence that price changes are eventually fully passed on
to end users. Consumers can have perceptions of rockets
and feathers even when the phenomenon does not exist,
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because a price lag is inevitable in all markets and because,
after a period of exceptionally high prices, consumers are
anxious to see prices come down. It is important to have
public awareness campaigns so that wrong perceptions do
not lead to misguided policies.
An important step is empowering consumers by provid-
ing them with price information. In this way, the cost of search-
ing for lower prices can be reduced. The first priority is to
require that all filling stations display prices on display boards
using letter sizes that are clearly visible from the road, and
enforce that rule. Vehicle drivers can obtain information about
prices as they drive, even when they are not looking to refill
their fuel tanks.
Another step is to make historical price information
publicly available. One example of how a government has
come about publishing prices is Tanzania. The government
liberalized the petroleum sector in 2000. In 2007, the Energy
and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority of Tanzania
(EWURA) conducted an inquiry—soliciting comments
through mass media and holding a public hearing—into the
circumstances leading to a uniform price increase that oc-
curred on July 1, 2007. The inquiry did not find clear evi-
dence of price collusion. However, the report on the find-
ings of the inquiry cited several areas of inefficiency in the
supply chain. One recommendation was to require all filling
stations to “publish on clearly visible boards prices charged
for petroleum products on sale” on their premises. To pro-
mote more effective competition, EWURA began publish-
ing, on its website, “indicative” retail prices—prices con-
sidered reasonable based on import-parity price levels—as
well as price ceilings, set 7.5 percent above indicative prices,
in different parts of the country [4].
Among Cambodia’s neighbors, Thailand’s Energy Policy
and Planning Office (EPPO) posts the price buildup of each
petroleum product in Bangkok daily. Ex-refinery, wholesale,
and retail prices, as well as all taxes and charges are shown
separately for a total of 11 products [7]; the effort involved in
collecting so much information would be considerable. In
addition, monthly average wholesale and retail prices, and
taxes collected are posted on EPPO’s website [8].
Posting prices is clearly easier if prices are controlled. If
prices are uniform throughout the country and are changed
only once a month, then the government can easily post
prices for the entire country. This approach to pricing, how-
ever, almost never makes for efficient market operations. If
prices are determined by market forces, as in all developed
countries, a survey of retail prices will have to be carried out
regularly. The U.S. Department of Energy surveys gasoline
(approximately 115,000) and diesel outlets throughout the
country and posts weekly retail prices [9]. The Philippine
Department of Energy conducts price surveys in three cities
once a week and posts prices for seven products by com-
pany [10]. Posting historical prices is invaluable—consum-
ers can see historical patterns—and should not be difficult
because it entails merely retaining information already col-
lected. For Cambodia, posting spot prices of gasoline, die-
sel, and kerosene in Singapore, both in U.S. dollars and after
conversion to riel, might also be informative.
Although the perception of uneven price changes de-
pending on whether oil prices are rising or falling is wide-
spread, it is difficult to demonstrate rigorously that such a
pattern exists. And even where such a pattern can reason-
ably be shown to exist, demonstrating that it was caused by
a market failure—firms colluding to keep prices high—is even
more challenging.
Cambodia’s oil market is relatively small, making price
competition inherently more difficult to achieve. But even in
such a market, empowering consumers with information about
prices, current and historical, and explaining mechanisms
for price transmission specific to the Cambodian market goes
a long way to promoting competition, while helping to dis-
pel misperceptions about legitimate price lags.
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